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ABSTRACT
This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are
difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between cash and coupons to purchase
units of the defendant’s product at a discount –  a “coupon-cash remedy” – is superior to cash alone.
The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to
plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons,
and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to
better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing
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In many consumer lawsuits, the remedy takes the form of awarding plaintiffs coupons 
that can be used to purchase the defendant’s product at a discounted price.  Commentators 
generally have been highly critical of this type of remedy.  The dominant reason is that coupons 
are thought to facilitate a settlement between the defendant and the lawyers representing the class 
of consumers that is not in the best interests of the consumers.
1  Coupons also have been shown 
in some circumstances to give defendants an incentive to raise the prices of their products and in 
other circumstances to lead consumers to buy an excessive amount of the products.
2 
In this article we show that the use of coupons can be socially valuable.  Specifically, we 
demonstrate that it is possible to design a remedy in which coupons are offered as an alternative 
to cash — a “coupon-cash remedy” — that will lead defendant firms to bear costs that better 
reflect the harms that they have caused.
3  By making firms’ costs more closely correspond to 
their harms, the remedy will induce firms to make better ex ante decisions regarding how much 
care to take.
4   
To see why a coupon-cash remedy can lead to more accurate liability for defendants, 
consider the following example, motivated by the facts in Tuchman v. Volvo Cars of North 
                                                 
1 Specifically, a defendant and a class lawyer have an incentive to overstate the value of the coupons to the 
class, so that the defendant’s costs are reduced and the lawyer’s legal fees are enhanced.  See generally Miller and 
Singer (1997, pp. 107-12) and Leslie (2002, pp. 1004-52). 
2 See, respectively, Borenstein (1996) and Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003). 
3 Remedies involving a choice of cash or coupons have been used in a number of cases.  See Gramlich 
(1986, pp. 273, 274n.31), Note (1996, pp. 823-24), Miller and Singer (1997, pp. 102-03, 123), and Leslie (2002, pp. 
1056-57).  See also note 5 below. 
4 See Kaplow and Shavell (1996) for a general discussion of the circumstances under which firms will 
make better care decisions as a result of damages being measured more accurately.  See also Spier (1994). 
  - 2 - America.
5  Suppose a car manufacturer chooses a type of tire that, given the common use of its 
cars, makes the tires unusually prone to failure when driving on pot-holed pavement.  Such 
pavement is much more common in urban areas than in suburban areas.  As a result, drivers who 
drive primarily in urban areas have higher expected damages than drivers who drive primarily in 
suburban areas.  Suppose also that it is very difficult or expensive to determine the driving habits 
of tens of thousands of class members.  The court now offers the following remedy: coupons 
good for the purchase of four new tires during the next year, with a face value of $1,000, or $500 
in cash.  The coupon option will be more valuable to individuals who drive mainly in urban 
areas, while the cash alternative will be more valuable to individuals who drive primarily in 
suburban areas.  Thus, the liability costs borne by the car manufacturer will naturally reflect the 
driving habits of — and therefore the harms suffered by — its customers.  In contrast, if a cash 
remedy were used alone in these circumstances, a court would find it difficult to determine how 
much harm had been caused and would be likely to either overestimate or underestimate 
damages. 
The point of the preceding paragraph is relevant in a wide range of circumstances.  It 
applies whenever damages are difficult to measure, plaintiffs vary in the harm suffered, and 
plaintiffs who incurred above-average losses are likely to have above-average demands for the 
defendant’s product in the future.  It is then possible to structure a coupon-cash remedy that leads 
high-loss plaintiffs to prefer coupons and low-loss plaintiffs to prefer a smaller cash alternative; 
                                                 
5 Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Civil Action Docket No. BER-L-1808-97, 
available at http://www.gardencitygroup.com/cases (see link to “Volvo Tire Settlement”).  The settlement offered 
“authorized claimants” a choice of four new replacement tires, or a $1,000 credit towards the purchase or lease of a 
new Volvo, or $500 in cash. 
  - 3 - the plaintiffs’ choices reveal the relative mix of high-loss and low-loss victims, and thereby 
result in a more accurate assessment of damages.
6 
  We formally analyze the coupon-cash remedy in a model in which firms differ in the 
distribution of harms they cause to victims.  Ideally, firms that cause higher expected harm 
should take greater care.  The court, however, cannot observe firm type directly.  Thus, if a pure 
cash remedy were employed, it would have to be the same for all firm types and would lead to 
underdeterrence of firms that cause high harm on average and overdeterrence of firms that cause 
low harm on average.  We demonstrate that it is possible to construct a coupon-cash remedy that 
reduces both the underdeterrence and the overdeterrence that would result under the cash 
remedy. 




II.  The Superiority of the Coupon-Cash Remedy 
  In this section we compare the coupon-cash remedy to the pure cash remedy in a general 
model.  Each firm chooses a level of care that affects the probability of harm.  Victims differ in 
the level of harm that they suffer.  Each firm is characterized by a parameter that determines the 
distribution of harm among victims.  Let 
                                                 
6 For another illustration of how a coupon-cash remedy could help reveal damages, consider the following 
example.  Suppose that the pricing of upgrades to a computer operating system has been deemed to be 
anticompetitive.  Some consumers upgrade frequently, and suffer relatively high harm, while others do so only 
occasionally, and suffer relatively low harm.  A time-limited coupon for a discount off of the price of an upgrade is 
more valuable to the former group, while a smaller cash alternative may be preferred by the latter group. 
7 To our knowledge, the point that a coupon-cash remedy can reveal harm better than a pure cash remedy, 
and thereby induce better care decisions by potential injurers, has not been made previously.  Relatedly, however, 
Gramlich (1986, pp. 268-69) discusses the advantage of a coupon remedy over a cash remedy in terms of  
  - 4 -   x = level of care chosen by a firm;  
  p(x) = probability that harm occurs; pN(x) < 0; 
  h = harm suffered by a consumer; 
  θ = firm type; 0 # θ # 1; 
  g(θ) = density of firm types; 
  f(h, θ) = density of harm among consumers caused by a θ-type firm; and  
  F(h, θ) = cumulative distribution of harm among consumers. 
We assume that Fθ < 0, so firms with a higher θ cause higher harm on average.   
 Let 
   h ¯(θ) = average harm suffered by consumers of a θ-type firm, 
where 
                                                                   4 
                                                        h ¯(θ) = Ihf(h, θ)dh. (1) 
                                                                  0 
 
Note that h ¯(θ) also represents total harm, assuming that the population is normalized to be unity.   
The first-best level of care for a θ-type firm, x*(θ), minimizes 
                                                             x + p(x)h ¯(θ). (2) 
Obviously, x*(θ) is strictly increasing in θ since h ¯(θ) is strictly increasing in θ. 
We assume that if an accident occurs, firms are strictly liable for harm. 
The cash remedy.  Under a pure cash remedy, the court determines the level of damages 
to impose on the defendant firm.  Let 
  d = damages imposed under the cash remedy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
compensating victims without having to identify them (though he does not consider a coupon-cash remedy in this 
regard). 
  - 5 - The court is assumed to know the various distributions described above, but not each defendant 
firm’s type. 
  Consider the behavior of a firm, given damages d.  The firm will pick the level of care x 
to minimize 
                                                                                 x + p(x)d. (3) 
Let x(d), which is independent of θ, be the solution to this problem.  The court’s problem then is 
to choose d to minimize social costs, 
                                                                             1   
                                                       x(d) + p(x(d))Ih ¯(θ)g(θ)dθ. (4) 
                                                                            0  
  
  We now show that, given optimal damages d*, there exists a firm whose θ is strictly 
between 0 and 1 that takes first-best care; we designate this the θ*-type firm.  Firms with lower θ 
take excessive care and firms with higher θ take inadequate care.   
To see that there exists a θ*-type firm, suppose otherwise, that x(d*) $ x*(1) or x(d*) # 
x*(0).  Suppose first that x(d*) > x*(1).  Since every firm is taking excessive care, social costs 
clearly would decline if d were lower.  Now suppose x(d*) = x*(1).  Given that the 1-type firm is 
taking first-best care, the derivative of (2) with respect to x evaluated at x(d*) is 0 for θ = 1 and 
positive for θ < 1 (since x*(θ) is strictly increasing in θ).  The derivative of social costs (4) with 
respect to damages d can be written as 
                                                              1   
                                                      xN(d)I[(1 + pN(x(d))h ¯(θ)]g(θ)dθ. (5) 
                                                              0  
  
Clearly, xN(d) > 0.  The expression in brackets is the derivative of (2) with respect to x, which is 
positive for θ < 1 and 0 for θ = 1.  It follows that (5) must be positive, contradicting the 
  - 6 - optimality of d*.  Hence, x(d*) < x*(1).  By a similar argument, it follows that x(d*) > x*(0).  
Thus, given d*, there exists a firm such that 0 < θ < 1 that takes first-best care. 
  To summarize, the pure cash remedy is a second-best outcome in which all firms are 
induced to take the same level of care because the court cannot make the costs borne by each 
firm depend on the harm it causes.  Consequently, some firms (θ < θ*) are induced to take 
excessive care, while other firms (θ > θ*) are induced to take too little care.  Only one type of 
firm — the θ*-firm — takes first-best care. 
  The coupon-cash remedy.  Under a coupon-cash remedy, the court chooses the number of 
coupons to award and a cash alternative.  We assume that the value a consumer attaches to a 
coupon depends on the harm he has suffered, with the valuation increasing in harm (consistent 
with the tire example described in the introduction).  The cost to the firm for each coupon that is 
redeemed is the same for all consumers.
8  Let 
  n = number of coupons available to each consumer;  
  v(h) = value of each coupon to a consumer whose harm is h; vN(h) > 0; 
  c = cost to a firm of each coupon that is redeemed; and  
  m = cash alternative available to each consumer (“m” for money). 
  Consider the decisions of consumers whether to elect coupons or cash.  An h-type 
consumer — a consumer whose harm is h — will prefer coupons over cash if nv(h) > m.  To 
make the comparison between the coupon-cash remedy and the pure cash remedy interesting, we 
                                                 
8 We make this assumption for simplicity.  This would be the case if all consumers electing to receive 
coupons would have purchased the good anyway, for then each coupon results in the same loss of revenue. 
  - 7 - assume that n and m are chosen so that for some positive value of h, consumers are indifferent 
between coupons and cash.
9  Let 
  h ^(m, n) = value of h at which a consumer is indifferent between cash amount m and n coupons. 
Since the value of coupons is increasing in h, consumers with lower h prefer cash and consumers 
with higher h prefer coupons. 
  Given consumers’ decisions, the cost borne by a θ-type firm is 
                                                            mF(h ^(m, n), θ) + nc(1 – F(h ^(m, n), θ)). (6) 
  To demonstrate that the coupon-cash remedy is superior to the cash remedy, we first 
show that it is possible to pick the number of coupons n and the cash alternative m such that the 
θ*-firm under the coupon-cash remedy bears the same cost as under the pure cash remedy and 
therefore continues to choose first-best care.  This condition will be satisfied for any n and m 
combination such that 
                                                    mF(h ^(m, n), θ*) + nc(1 – F(h ^(m, n), θ*)) = d*. (7) 
Observe that if m is set equal to d* and n is set equal to d*/c, so that nc = d*, then (7) would be 
satisfied, and the outcome for all firms under the coupon-cash remedy would be identical to that 
under the pure cash remedy. 
  To see that it is feasible to set n = d*/c, observe that the upper bound on n, call it n ~(m), is 
determined by the requirement that not all consumers prefer coupons to cash.  In other words,    
n ~(m) solves n ~(m)v(0) = m, so that n ~(m) = m/v(0).  Thus, n = d*/c is feasible if d*/c < n ~(d*) = 
d*/v(0) or, equivalently, if v(0) < c.  This condition states that the consumer who suffers the least 
                                                 
9 Otherwise, all consumers would elect cash or all consumers would elect coupons.  The latter outcome is 
equivalent to the pure cash remedy from the perspective of firms.  The reason is that the cost to each firm is 
independent of the harm suffered by the plaintiff; consequently, all firms would take the same level of care. 
  - 8 - harm, and consequently values coupons the least, values a coupon less than the cost to the 
defendant of providing the coupon.  We assume that this plausible condition holds. 
  We next show that, starting from m = d* and n = d*/c, it is possible to lower m and raise 
n so as to reduce the excessive care taken by firms with θ < θ* and increase the inadequate care 
taken by firms with θ > θ*, while still satisfying (7).   
Starting from m = d* and n = d*/c, it is obvious that if m decreases, n must increase in 
order for (7) to be satisfied again; otherwise the left-hand-side of (7) would be a weighted 
average of d* and a number less than d*.   
To see that there exists an n high enough to restore the effect of the reduction in m, lower 
m to d* – ε and raise n to (d*/c) + δ(ε), where δ(ε) is chosen to satisfy (7).  It is clear from the 
definition of h ^(m, n) that lowering m and raising n reduces h ^ (both changes make coupons more 
attractive relative to cash).  Consequently, F(h ^(m, n), θ*) decreases and (1 – F(h ^(m, n), θ*)) 
increases.  It follows that the necessary increase in n required to satisfy (7) is less than the 
increase in n needed if F(.) and (1 – F(.)) did not change.  We next calculate the δ — referred to 
as δ ¯(ε) — required to satisfy (7) on the assumption that F(.) and (1 – F(.)) do not change.  This δ 
solves 
                            (d* – ε)F(h ^(d*, d*/c), θ*) + ((d*/c) + δ)c(1 – F(h ^(d*, d*/c), θ*)) = d*. (8) 
Thus,  
                                                   δ ¯(ε) = εF(h ^(d*, d*/c), θ*)/c(1 - F(h ^(d*, d*/c), θ*)). (9) 
We now show that n = (d*/c) + δ ¯(ε) is feasible, that is, that (d*/c) + δ ¯(ε) < n ~(d* – ε) = (d* – 
ε)/v(0), or [(d*/c) + δ ¯(ε)]v(0) < d* – ε.  This condition is satisfied for ε sufficiently small because 
as ε goes to 0, δ ¯(ε) goes to zero (see (9)), and the condition becomes v(0) < c, which we 
  - 9 - previously assumed holds.  Clearly, therefore, n = (d*/c) + δ(ε) is feasible for ε sufficiently 
small. 
  We next demonstrate that by picking ε sufficiently small, we can improve the care 
choices of all firms other than the θ*-firm without affecting the care choice of that firm.  To do 
this, we demonstrate that the slope of the care function (care as a function of θ) is positive if ε is 
positive, but can be made arbitrarily small by picking ε sufficiently small; therefore, this slope 
can be made less than the slope of the first-best care function.  This implies that firms for which 
θ < θ* can be induced to take less care, but not too much less care, and firms for which θ > θ* 
can be induced to take more care, but not too much more care. 
  From (2), the first-order condition determining the first-best level of care for a θ-type 
firm, x*(θ), is 
                                                                                           1 + pN(x*(θ))h ¯(θ) = 0.                                               (10) 
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied, which requires that pO(.) > 0.  Totally 
differentiate (10) with respect to θ to obtain: 
                                                                   pO(x*(θ))x*N (θ)h ¯(θ) +  pN(x*(θ)) h ¯N(θ) = 0.                                               (11) 
Given our assumption that Fθ < 0, firms with a higher θ cause higher harm, so h ¯N(θ) > 0.  Since 
pN(.) < 0 and pO(.) > 0, (11) implies that x*N (θ) > 0.  Let the minimum value of the slope of the 
first-best care function be  
                                                                                    xM *N   = inf [x*N (θ)].                                               (12) 
                                                                 θ є [0, 1] 
 
  Under the coupon-cash remedy with m = d* – ε and n = (d*/c) + δ(ε), a θ-type firm 
chooses care level x(θ) to minimize 
                                                                            x(θ) + p(x(θ))l(θ), (13) 
  - 10 - where 
                   l(θ) = {(d* – ε)F(h ^(d* – ε, (d*/c) + δ(ε)), θ)  
                                        + ((d*/c) + δ(ε))c(1 – F(h ^(d* – ε, (d*/c) + δ(ε)), θ)). (14) 
By steps analogous to those employed in the preceding paragraph, it is straightforward to show 
that  
                                            pO(x(θ))xN (θ)l(θ) +  pN(x(θ))lN(θ) = 0.  (15) 
Observe that lN(θ) = –[ε + cδ(ε)]Fθ > 0 since Fθ < 0.  Thus, xN (θ) > 0.  In other words, for ε > 0 
the slope of the care function under the coupon-cash remedy is positive.  Moreover, as ε goes to 
zero, lN(θ) goes to zero (since δ(ε) also goes to zero), which implies that xN (θ) goes to zero.  
Therefore, it is possible to pick ε sufficiently small so that the slope of the care function under 
the coupon-cash remedy is less than the slope of the care function in the first-best solution for all 
values of θ, that is, less than xM *N  defined by (12).  This implies that if ε is small enough, the 
coupon-cash remedy does not cause firms for which θ < θ* to take too little care, or cause firms 
for which θ > θ* to take too much care.  Thus, there exists a ε > 0 that improves the care decision 
of every firm without affecting the care decision of the θ*-firm.
10 
 
III.  An Example 
  In this section we present an example that illustrates the superiority of the coupon-cash 
remedy.  There are two levels of harm, low harm hL and high harm hH.  Firms either take low 
care xL or high care xH.  The respective probabilities of harm occurring are p(xL) > p(xH).  There 
                                                 
10 Although we have shown that a coupon-cash remedy can lead to better care decisions of firms, the 
detrimental effects of coupons (discussed in the first paragraph of this article) also need to be taken into account.  .  
  - 11 - are two types of firms, a low-harm causing firm θL and a high-harm causing firm θH, where θ is 
the fraction of high-harm victims injured by a firm, with θL < θH.  The total harm caused by each 
firm is, respectively, h ¯L = (1 – θL)hL + θLhH and h ¯H = (1 – θH)hL + θHhH. 
  We assume that the first-best solution involves the θL-firm taking low care xL and the θH-
firm taking high care xH.  In other words, 
                                                                            xL + p(xL)h ¯L  < xH + p(xH)h ¯L,                                               (16) 
and 
                                                            xH + p(xH)h ¯H < xL + p(xL)h ¯H.                                (17) 
  Under the cash remedy, in which both firms are subject to a damage payment d, they will 
take high care if and only if  
                                                               xH + p(xH)d < xL + p(xL)d.                                (18) 
Because the government cannot distinguish between the firms, the outcome under the cash 
remedy must be that both firms take low care or both firms take high care.  We assume that the 
second-best outcome is for both firms to take high care.  This can be accomplished by setting d 
to satisfy (18), that is, d* > (xH – xL)/[p(xL) – p(xH)].  Thus, under the cash remedy, too much care 
will be taken by the θL-firm. 
  Now consider the coupon-cash remedy, and let vL and vH be the value of a coupon to low-
harm and high-harm victims, respectively, with vL < vH.  Low-harm victims will choose the cash 
alternative m and high-harm victims will choose the n coupons if 
                                                                nvL # m < nvH.                                (19) 
  - 12 - Assuming (19) holds, the costs borne by the two firms if harm occurs are, respectively, h ~
L(m, n) 
= m(1 – θL) + ncθL and h ~
H(m, n) = m(1 – θH) + ncθH.  Thus, the low-harm firm will choose low 
care if and only if 
                                              xL + p(xL)h ~
L(m, n) < xH + p(xH)h ~
L(m, n), (20) 
and the high-harm firm will choose high care if and only if 
                                              xH + p(xH)h ~
H(m, n) < xL + p(xL)h ~
H(m, n) (21) 
We now show that there exists a number of coupons n and a cash amount m that satisfies 
(19), (20), and (21), and that thereby achieves the first-best outcome.  First, let m = nvL.  It is 
clear, then, that (19) holds since vL < vH.  After some manipulation, it also can be seen that (20) 
and (21) will hold if and only if 
                      (xH – xL)/[p(xL) – p(xH)][vL(1 – θH) + cθH] < n  
(22) 
                                                        < (xH – xL)/[p(xL) – p(xH)][vL(1 – θL) + cθL].       
 
Since vL < c (this follows from our assumption in the general model that v(0) < c) and θL < θH, 
the left-hand term in (22) is less than the right-hand term.  Thus, there exists an n that satisfies 
(22), and which consequently generates a first-best outcome. 
  To illustrate the significance of the coupon-cash remedy, let the levels of harm be hL = 
$100 and hH = $1,000; the costs of care xL = $50 and xH = $250; the probabilities of harm p(xL) = 
.4 and p(xH) = .1; and the firm types θL = .2 and θH = .8.  The first-best solution requires that the 
θL-firm, which causes harm of h ¯L = $280, take low care, and the θH-firm, which causes harm of 
h ¯H = $800, take high care.  Under the pure cash remedy, the second-best solution is for both 
firms to take high care, which can be accomplished by setting damages at d* > $667.  This 
results in social costs of $317.  Under the coupon-cash remedy, let the valuation of coupons be vL 
  - 13 - = $5 and vH = $30; and the cost to a firm of issuing a coupon be c = $25.  Then, for example, if 
the remedy consists of the choice of 40 coupons or $200 in cash, the low-harm victims will 
choose cash and the high-harm victims will choose coupons.  Now, instead of both firms bearing 
damages of d* > $667 when harm occurs, the θL-firm bears costs of $360, which causes it to 
choose low care, and the θH-firm bears costs of $840, which causes it to choose high care.  This 
results in social costs under the coupon-cash remedy of $288, a 9.1 percent improvement. 
  - 14 - References 
Borenstein, Severin, “Settling for Coupons:  Discount Contracts as Compensation and 
Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 39, No. 2 
(October 1996), pp. 379-404. 
Gramlich, Fred, “Scrip Damages in Antitrust Cases,” The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 31, No. 1 
(Spring 1986), pp. 261-85. 
Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell, “Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages,” Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 191-210. 
Leslie, Christopher R., “A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and 
Consumer Class Action Litigation,” UCLA Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 
991-1098. 
Miller, Geoffrey P., and Lori S. Singer, “Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 97-154. 
Note, “In-Kind Class Action Settlements,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 4 (February 
1996), pp. 810-27. 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Remedies for Price Overcharges: The 
Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts,” Working Paper No. 271, John M. Olin 
Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, November 2003 (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=471001). 
Spier, Kathryn E., “Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards,” Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization, Vol. 10, No. 1 (April 1994), pp. 84-95. 
  - 15 - 